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Abstract 
Overdiagnosis is an emerging problem in health policy and practice: we address its definition 
and ethical implications. We argue that the definition of overdiagnosis should be expressed 
at the level of populations. Consider a condition prevalent in a population, customarily 
labelled with Diagnosis A. We propose that overdiagnosis is occurring in respect of that 
condition in that population when: 1) the condition is being identified and labelled with 
Diagnosis A in that population (consequent interventions may also be offered); 2) this 
identification and labelling would be accepted as correct in a relevant professional 
community; but 3) the resulting label and/or intervention carries an unfavourable balance 
between benefits and harms. We identify challenges in determining and weighting relevant 
harms, then propose three central ethical considerations in overdiagnosis: the extent of 
harm done, whether harm is avoidable, and whether the primary goal of the actor/s 
concerned is to benefit themselves, or the patient, citizen or society. This distinguishes 
predatory (avoidable, self-benefiting), misdirected (avoidable, other-benefiting), and tragic 
(unavoidable, other-benefiting) overdiagnosis; the degree of harm moderates the 
justifiability of each type.  We end with four normative challenges: 1) methods for 
adjudicating between professional standards and identifying relevant harms and benefits 
should be procedurally just; 2) individuals, organisations and states are differently 
responsible for addressing overdiagnosis; 3) overdiagnosis is a matter for distributive justice: 
the burdens of both overdiagnosis and its prevention could fall on the least-well-off; and 4) 
communicating about overdiagnosis risks harming those unaware that they may have been 
overdiagnosed. These challenges will need to be addressed as the field develops. 
 
Keywords: Overdiagnosis; medicalization; classification analysis; ethical analysis; iatrogenic 
disease; medical errors; health services misuse 
 
 
Overdiagnosis occurs when someone is diagnosed with a disease that would not 
have harmed them, often as a result of undergoing screening, and evidence is 
emerging that many people are overdiagnosed and labelled unnecessarily across a 
range of conditions.1 
 
[Cancer] overdiagnosis refers to the detection of cancers that, in the absence of 
screening, would not present symptomatically.2 
 
Overdiagnosis is commonly defined as diagnosing a person without symptoms 
with a disease that will never cause symptoms or death during the person’s 
lifetime.3 
 
[Cancer] overdiagnosis is the detection of cancers that would not have been 
identified clinically in someone’s remaining lifetime.4 
 
Narrowly defined, overdiagnosis occurs when people without symptoms are 
diagnosed with a disease that ultimately will not cause them to experience 
symptoms or early death. More broadly defined, overdiagnosis refers to the 
related problems of overmedicalization and subsequent overtreatment, 
diagnosis creep, shifting thresholds, and disease mongering, all processes 
helping to reclassify healthy people with mild problems or at low risk as sick.5 
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Overdiagnosis, the detection and diagnosis of a condition that would not go on to 
cause symptoms or death in the patient’s lifetime, is an inevitable harm of 
screening… A patient who is overdiagnosed cannot benefit from the diagnosis or 
treatment but can only be harmed...6 
 
Overdiagnosis is the term used when a condition is diagnosed that would 
otherwise not go on to cause symptoms or death... [Cancer] overdiagnosis 
should not be confused with false-positive results, that is, a positive test in an 
individual who is subsequently recognized not to have cancer. By contrast, an 
overdiagnosed patient [with cancer] has a tumor that fulfils the pathological 
criteria for cancer.7  
 
Overdiagnosis is a relatively new, rapidly growing field of inquiry; its foundations are still 
being established.5 In our earlier work, we noted (as others have done3) that there are many 
‘over’ terms, including overdetection,  overtreatment, overutilisation and 
(over)medicalization; there has been a tendency in the literature to use the label 
‘overdiagnosis’ to refer to all of these.8 Contra this, we and others have argued for the 
distinctness of these concepts, and for a narrower conception of overdiagnosis.8 9 Here we 
focus on the narrow, not the broad, meaning.i   
 
We contribute to the overdiagnosis literature by answering two interrelated questions: 1) 
How should overdiagnosis be defined? 2) What are the ethical implications of overdiagnosis?  
 
Defining overdiagnosis 
Most articles about overdiagnosis assert a brief working definition, then get on with the task 
at hand, which is usually to: 1) quantify overdiagnosis; 2) determine the consequences of 
overdiagnosis; and/or 3) describe the causal pathways by which over-diagnosis occurs. 
Considerable work has been done on causal pathways in particular. These include expanded 
disease definitions, the creation of ‘pre-diseases’, increasingly sensitive tests, incidental test 
findings of uncertain significance, more frequent and intensive testing, commercial interests 
that seek to expand markets for treatments, and increasing acceptance of risk reduction as 
an indicator of effectiveness of intervention.3 5 9 10 11 
 
Few authors have focused on defining overdiagnosis. Pamela Marcus and colleagues (who 
describe cancer overdiagnosis as the detection of cancers that, in the absence of screening, 
would not present symptomatically) recently published a ‘Tumor-Patient Classification’ of 
cancer overdiagnosis, with the goal of differentiating ways in which cancer overdiagnosis 
occurs (Table 1).2 Wendy Rogers and Yishai Mintzker have distinguished between 
misclassification overdiagnosis (occurring when a diagnostic threshold is set such that non-
harmful disease is often diagnosed), and maldetection diagnosis (arising from the inability to 
distinguish between harmful and non-harmful cases of the index disease).12 Bjørn Hofmann 
has published on both the conceptualisation of overdiagnosis and its relationship to 
medicalization.3 9 He proposed a new nomenclature to replace the term overdiagnosis which 
has not yet been taken up in the literature, perhaps partly because of its complexity.3 These 
typologies each make a contribution; in our view the literature still lacks a general and well-
justified definition of overdiagnosis.  
                                                 
i
 Overdiagnosis is distinct from the other ‘over’ concepts in several ways. This includes that 
overdiagnosis can only occur when a diagnosis is made, in contrast to the broader concepts such as 
medicalisation and overuse. We have suggested elsewhere that a term like ‘too much medicine’ should 
be used as a broad umbrella term instead of overdiagnosis to prevent confusion (see 8. Carter SM, 
Rogers W, Heath I, Degeling C, Doust J, Barratt A. The challenge of overdiagnosis begins with its 
definition. BMJ 2015;350:doi 10.1136/bmj.h869.)  
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Table 1: The Tumor-Patient classification of cancer overdiagnosis (Pamela Marcus and 
colleagues)2 
 
 Cancer overdiagnosis occurs because 
screening detects… 
Indolent or 
non-indolent 
cancer? 
Example of a screening 
program likely to produce 
overdiagnosis via this route 
Tumor A “Asymptomatic malignant disease that 
regresses spontaneously if left alone”  
Indolent Neuroblastoma screening of 
infants  
Tumor B “Asymptomatic malignant disease that either 
stagnates or progresses too slowly to be life 
threatening in even the longest of lifetimes”  
Indolent PSA testing to detect 
prostate cancer risk  
Patient “Asymptomatic malignant disease that 
progresses quickly enough to be life 
threatening during a lifetime of typical length, 
but death because of another cause occurs 
prior to what would have been the destined 
date of symptomatic diagnosis had screening 
not occurred”  
Non-indolent Low Dose CT scanning for 
lung cancer (because heavy 
smokers may die of another 
smoking-caused disease 
before they die of lung 
cancer) 
To quote Marcus and colleagues: "We believe that the ratio of tumour to patient-driven overdiagnosis almost 
certainly varies by organ, screening modality, patient characteristics, and other factors (p. 2).” 
PSA, prostate specific antigen. 
 
We began by quoting the brief definitions asserted by leaders in the field. These demonstrate 
a rough meaning-in-use for overdiagnosis: ‘a correct diagnosis that does not benefit’. This 
suggests that correctness and failure to benefit are necessary features of any instance of 
overdiagnosis, and thus that defining overdiagnosis will require: 1) distinguishing correct 
from incorrect diagnoses; and 2) determining what should count as a benefit. We will 
consider each of these in the following sections, but begin with two observations.  
 
First, overdiagnosis does not only occur in the clinic. In particular, as testing, genetic 
sequencing and biomonitoring become increasingly available and networked, more citizens 
will detect and diagnose health risks or diseases for themselves, sometimes assisted by 
commercial interests. Second, it seems that overdiagnosis can occur only when something is 
identified as a health-related problem. So when doctors say ‘that mole looks worrying’ or 
‘you are clinically depressed’ or ‘I’ll refer you to the specialist’ or ‘we should cut that out’ or 
‘you should take this medication’, overdiagnosis could occur, but not when doctors advise 
that there is no problem. Relatedly, the offering of an intervention should be considered a 
probable but non-necessary component of an overdiagnosis, for two reasons. A small 
amount of benefit may accrue simply from being diagnosed (for example the psychosocial 
benefit of ‘knowing what’s wrong’), but diagnoses benefit most by attracting interventions, 
such as treatment for the experienced problem. Conversely, diagnosis does not always 
attract an intervention—for example, when a clinician labels a disease but has no effective 
treatment available to use—and it seems important that these instances are open to being 
classed as overdiagnosis.  
 
This suggests a revision of the definition, from ‘a correct diagnosis that does not benefit’ to 
this: overdiagnosis occurs when a health-related problem is correctly identified and labelled 
(an intervention may also be offered) but this does not benefit. 
 
Overdiagnosis is ‘correct’ diagnosis 
If overdiagnosis must be correct, then it must be possible to distinguish correct from 
incorrect diagnosis. The question is how this should be done. In the overdiagnosis literature, 
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authors frequently rely on a correspondence standard for this task.4 5 7 A correspondence 
standard implies that a correct judgment or action corresponds to material or biological 
reality: a cancer diagnosis, for example, is correct when a person ‘truly has cancer’ and the 
resulting treatment is correct when a cancer ‘really goes into remission’. These assumptions 
are generally implicit rather than being argued out, but they align loosely with a materialist 
or objectivist conception of disease and diagnosis in the philosophy of science.13  
 
In our view, noticing and modifying these assumptions is vital to the development of thinking 
about overdiagnosis. The arguments for softening a strong objectivist model of disease are 
well-worked.13 Throughout history, diagnostic judgments and actions thought to correspond 
to material reality have repeatedly arisen, become accepted, and then been abandoned as 
the seat of disease was again reconceptualised.14 Diabetes, for example, was understood to 
be a disorder of carbohydrate metabolism, then a pancreatic dysfunction, then a problem of 
glucose control and regulation; the corresponding diagnostic tests—urinalysis, then oral 
glucose tolerance tests, then Haemoglobin A1C titres—reflected and shaped understandings 
of diabetes as a condition.15 16 Unitary conceptions of diseases have given way to diverse 
pathological conceptions (e.g. in cancer). Many overdiagnosis-related problems stem from 
the continuous nature of pathological criteria, such that thresholds for distinguishing disease 
from non-disease are a matter for negotiation and interpretation.3 Conceptions of ‘correct’ 
treatment, and of how treatments work on disease biology, have shifted radically: consider 
starving therapy, then pancreatic extracts, then insulin and lifestyle therapy for diabetes.15 16 
And treatments considered ‘correct’ are never universally effective (so their effectiveness 
cannot be used as a reliable marker of their correctness).17 All of this makes it improbable 
that even present conceptions of disease correspond exactly to an underlying reality: history 
suggests that contemporary diagnoses and treatments will be overturned in future.ii   
 
Our preferred alternative: a professional community standard  
For these reasons, we prefer a professional community standard for distinguishing correct 
from incorrect diagnosis.19 By this we mean the following: ‘correct’ diagnoses are those that 
are accepted as correct within a relevant professional community. This recognises that 
medical and scientific expertise is important when adjudicating between correctness and 
incorrectness, and that health-related judgments and actions that occur outside the clinic can 
reasonably be judged against the knowledge of relevant professional communities. However 
it also acknowledges that standards for determining correct action are actively produced by 
members of a professional community, meaning that evidence is necessary but never 
sufficient to the task. 
 
Sometimes the active creation of ‘correct’ diagnoses is obvious: for example, in the 
negotiation of the relatively new diagnosis of pre-cancers, such as Ductal Carcinoma in Situ 
(DCIS) or High- and Low-grade Squamous Intraepithelial Lesion (HSIL/LSIL).20 21 However this 
also occurs more subtly. For example, the shift from morphological criteria to 
immunophenotyping as the basis for classifying and diagnosing leukemia and lymphomas 
                                                 
ii Personalised and precision medicine aim to achieve something close to the correspondence standard. If 
genomic tests were ever perfectly predictive of phenotypic disease expression in individuals, it is possible that 
they could become a means for avoiding overdiagnosis and overtreatment. However so far this seems rarely to 
be the case. This may lead either to overconfidence in the new technologies (which could drive overdiagnosis 
because genetic markers of uncertain significance become grounds for overzealous interventions) or 
underconfidence in the new technologies (which could nonetheless drive “just in case” overtreatment, but in the 
context of considerable uncertainty and anxiety). For a more detailed discussion see: 18. James JE. Personalised 
medicine, disease prevention, and the inverse care law: more harm than benefit? Eur. J. Epidemiol. 
2014;29(6):383-90. 
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involved active creation and co-ordination of equivalences between seemingly 
incommensurable clinical understandings, pathological descriptions, qualitative and 
quantitative diagnostic criteria, and professional interests in an otherwise clearly defined 
clinical domain.22 23 
 
Professions are communities of practice; members of these communities produce and 
instantiate the best available standard for practice at any given time. Explicit standard 
production is preferable, because this requires greater justification and accountability from 
participants. But standards can also develop implicitly, first instantiated through practice 
routines and then tacitly shared. A new test or drug, for example, can enter everyday 
practice through individual practitioners and their networks, without any formal 
endorsement from expert bodies. 
 
These observations again revise the definition of overdiagnosis to the following. 
Overdiagnosis occurs when: a health-related problem is identified and labelled (an 
intervention may also be offered), this identification and labelling would be accepted as 
correct in a relevant professional community, but it does not benefit.  
 
A professional community standard: implications 
There are three implications of recognising that the standard for ‘correct’ judgements and 
actions is negotiated intersubjectively in professional communities.  
 
First, overdiagnosis cannot be identified until a standard exists. There are several 
consequences of this. One is that the line between overdiagnosis and error, particularly false 
positives, may be less clear than is usually assumed. To date, the idea that overdiagnoses are 
correct and false positives incorrect has been central to the conception of overdiagnosis. But 
a tacit or explicit standard must exist, and be recognisable, for correct judgments and actions 
to be distinguished from incorrect ones. This means that, particularly in the earliest days of a 
practice or technology before standards are established, overdiagnosis and false positives 
may be indistinguishable.  
 
This is further complicated by conflict between professionals. Often sub-specialities or 
different disciplines hold competing understandings of conditions. Take peripheral vascular 
disease (atherosclerosis of the lower limb), which pathologists diagnose by narrow calcified 
vessel walls, cardiologists by low blood pressure in the legs, physiotherapists by the presence 
of claudication, and radiologists by narrowed vessels in a contrast study.24 25 Each discipline 
focuses on a different object—vessel walls, blood pressure, pain, and so on—demonstrating 
that standards are acts of co-ordination that somehow fold these different objects into one 
disease. If we acknowledge that the line separating ‘correct’ from ‘incorrect’ is negotiated 
within professional communities, and that different communities may work from quite 
different conceptions of conditions, it becomes apparent that disagreements about the 
prevalence of overdiagnosis may sometimes be disagreements within or between 
professional communities about what the reference standard for identifying a condition 
should be.  
 
Second: acknowledging that standards are produced in and by professional communities 
forces attention to the process by which they are developed, and so provides better analytic 
tools for dealing with disagreement over overdiagnosis. Recall the example of peripheral 
vascular disease. Advocates of a correspondence standard may insist that science should be 
able to determine which definition is truly ‘correct’, and thus dismiss the other partial or 
‘incorrect’ accounts. But this is of limited use, as all disciplines will have scientific cases to 
make. The professional community standard encourages us to ask how competing standards 
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are arrived at and by whom, and to understand disagreements about overdiagnosis as the 
result of differing processes of production, rather than as a result of one group being ‘right’ 
and the others ‘wrong’.  
The third implication follows: the professional community conception is the best basis for 
considering the vested interests, political pressures, and social norms and conventions that 
have been key concerns for those studying the drivers of overdiagnosis.26  
What conception of benefit (and harm) should we employ? 
Having considered the standard for ‘correctness’, we now move to the related issues of 
benefit and harm. Benefit or harm are good and bad consequences respectively, so are 
unavoidably normative. This means we cannot have a purely descriptive conception of 
overdiagnosis: normativity is built into the concept. Benefits and harms are not only physical: 
they can be of other kinds. Russell Harris and colleagues, for example, divide the harms of 
cancer screening into physical effects, psychological effects, financial strain, and opportunity 
costs.27   
 
Benefit and harm in individuals and populations   
The definitions quoted at the beginning of this paper all contain a particular implicit 
conception of non-benefit: the condition diagnosed would not have caused symptoms in the 
individual in their lifetime, such that there is no benefit to be had from the diagnosis.  These 
definitions implicitly work at the level of the individual. They assume a (perhaps hypothetical) 
patient and doctor, and attempt to point to situations in which that doctor overdiagnoses 
that patient. We propose, in contrast, that because overdiagnosis is almost exclusively 
observable at the level of populations, and non-observable at the level of the individual, it 
should be defined at the level of populations. This move is also made implicitly in Hofmann’s 
nomenclature, although it is not explicitly defended in those terms.3 
 
This issue can be usefully considered via Widdows and Cordell’s distinction between 
aggregative and corporate communal goods.28 ‘Aggregative communal goods’ are constituted 
of goods that attach to individuals: these individual goods aggregate to a communal good. In 
contrast, corporate goods attach to whole communities, emerging only as a property of that 
community. An increase in average lifespan, or a decrease in cancer incidence, are 
aggregative communal goods; a universal health care system is a corporate communal good.  
 
Overdiagnosis occurs in individuals, and these instances aggregate in populations. Critically, 
overdiagnosis can only be observed statistically, estimated via studies of whole populations. 
If a cancer screening program increases the incidence of early stage disease without reducing 
the incidence of late stage disease, for example, overdiagnosis will be statistically inferred. 
This may be occurring because there is no treatment available, because treatment is not 
beneficial, or (as in Marcus’ Tumour A and Tumour B types2) because screening-identified 
conditions would have remained unsymptomatic, so there was no benefit of detection to 
outweigh the resulting harmful labelling and intervention. The screening program is harming, 
or in the best case failing to benefit, individuals.  These individual cases aggregate to the 
observable population-level rate of overdiagnosis, but the individual cases can rarely be 
identified.3  
 
Imagine two asymptomatic women diagnosed with early stage invasive breast cancer 
following mammographic screening. Both have a mastectomy. For each, the harm of 
removing a breast is readily observable. However the benefit for each woman cannot be 
known, because it is unknown how each woman’s life would have proceeded without the 
diagnosis and surgery. Perhaps one of those women was going to develop life-threatening 
invasive breast cancer and the other was not. Perhaps, if left unscreened, one of these 
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women would have died of a heart attack within 5 years (before being diagnosed with breast 
cancer) but the other would have developed life-threatening invasive cancer in 10 years. In 
either of these scenarios, one woman has likely been overdiagnosed, and the other not. 
However this cannot be known for the individual women. This is what Hofmann describes as 
the problem of counterfactuality: that it is impossible to know what would have happened if 
a screened person had not been screened.3 Hofmann is correct about counterfactuality at an 
individual level; we would add to his observation, however, that each woman represents a 
case of early stage breast cancer in a population, and their cases can be aggregated with 
others to estimate overdiagnosis in that population.  
 
This pattern can be seen across a range of conditions. For example, when ventilation-
perfusion scanning was replaced by more sensitive CT pulmonary angiography, rates of 
diagnosis of pulmonary embolism increased; population-level data were required to reveal 
that this had increased rates of complications of anticoagulation but not reduced mortality 
rates.29 The diagnostic criteria for mild cognitive impairment and ‘pre-dementia’ are 
broadening, supported by new cognitive screening tests, cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers and 
neuroimaging. Population data suggest that such diagnoses often spontaneously resolve, are 
not consistently associated with progression to dementia, and produce a range of harms.30 
Changes in testing technology and threshold changes have increased the prevalence of ‘pre-
diabetes’ two- to three-fold, with massive prevalence in some populations (e.g. 50% in 
Chinese adults). However population-level data suggest this is not beneficial and may be 
producing new harms and costs.31 The counterfactuality problem makes it impossible for an 
individual diagnosed with pulmonary embolism, pre-dementia or pre-diabetes to know what 
would have occurred had they not received the diagnosis and intervention. However their 
outcomes can be aggregated, and this—at a population level—can allow overdiagnosis to be 
inferred. 
 
So: although overdiagnosis does occur in individuals, it can rarely be observed in individuals.iii 
It follows that, to be useful, the definition of overdiagnosis must be expressed at a 
population level rather than an individual level. Even if we were able to generate a satisfying 
individual-level definition, it could rarely be used. A useful definition of overdiagnosis will 
operate at a population level, and can be used as a guide to policy and practice. The goal 
would be to alter diagnostic practices in such a way that cases of overdiagnosis—the (largely 
unidentifiable) cases that would have aggregated to create the population-level rate of 
overdiagnosis—do not occur. 
Expressing the benefit and/or harm component of overdiagnosis in population terms 
requires thinking statistically or probabilistically. In addition, because treatment may cause 
harm in order to benefit, these two must be held in relation to one another in the definition. 
Cancer treatment, for example, is often harmful (e.g. causing nausea or bodily disfigurement) 
but can prevent early death, providing recipients with the benefit of decades more of life. 
Because of this, we judge it to be beneficial on balance, despite the harms.  Following this, 
the component of overdiagnosis relating to consequences should be expressed in terms of an 
unfavourable balance between benefits and harms.  
 
The unfavourable balance between benefits and harms relates to the aggregative good or 
bad of overdiagnoses. However overdiagnosis also produces corporate harms. Overdiagnosis 
mostly arises from system-level shifts: changing the definition of conditions, introducing new 
technologies, aggressively promoting testing. Because balance between benefits and harms 
                                                 
iii
 One unusual exception is when a person is diagnosed with early-stage cancer due to screening, refuses 
treatment, and does not advance to late-stage disease. Note, though, that there is no way of knowing at 
the time of diagnosis that the person is overdiagnosed: this can be known only retrospectively, after the 
passage of time and the non-emergence of symptoms.  
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caused by the diagnosis is unfavourable, the economic cost of these activities to the health 
system is not justified by their outcome. They effectively divert resources from more to less 
effective care.32 This has an aggregative component (the harms experienced by individuals 
whose care is compromised). But it is also a corporate harm: it produces a less responsive, 
less trustworthy, less effective health care system.iv Taking the resource allocation 
implications of overdiagnosis seriously entails identifying services most likely to do 
aggregative or corporate harm or wrong. This leads to the next question: how to define 
which benefits, harms or wrongs matter.  
 
Who should judge benefit and harm?  
There are two possible answers to the question of who should determine which benefits, 
harms or wrongs matter, each supported by reasonable arguments. Although these answers 
may seem incommensurable, they are likely to be combined in practice. 
 
The first answer is: individuals receiving interventions should be free to judge which benefits, 
harms and costs matter to them. This is a proceduralist view: it suggests that what matters is 
due process. Individuals, in this view, should not be coerced into interventions; some would 
suggest they should also be supported to choose in accordance with their values.35 This view 
loosely reflects classical liberalism, founded in the intrinsic political and moral significance of 
1) having one’s autonomy respected; and 2) having the liberty or freedom to pursue what 
one values. Such freedoms are unquestionably important, but this model is not 
uncomplicated.  
 
Aronowitz has made the important observation that once diagnosed, people may act in 
accordance with the worst case scenario rather than their own situation. For example, rates 
of prophylactic mastectomy have been increasing. Women diagnosed as ‘high risk’ for breast 
cancer (e.g. through genetic testing) have been electing to have mastectomies. Women 
diagnosed with Stage I, II and III breast cancer in one breast have been electing to have both 
breasts removed.11 Other work has also shown an increasing U.S. trend for American women 
diagnosed with Ductal Carcinoma In Situ, a pre-cancer or cancer risk factor, to opt for 
bilateral mastectomy.36 Importantly, although likelihood of benefit of prophylactic 
mastectomy will likely differ between these groups, uptake has been steadily increasing 
across all groups.11 Women may, of course, have excellent and carefully considered reasons 
for such choices. However this analysis suggests it is also possible that risk perception can 
lead us to accept interventions that are disproportionate to the problem, particularly if 
healthcare systems actively make them available to us.  
 
Other challenges face the proceduralist view. It may be difficult for clinicians to balance the 
preferences of individuals against resource implications for the system. Shared decision-
making is resource-intense, and dedicated efforts are required to ensure equitable 
outcomes.37 38 There is also a disjunct between this method of judging the balance of benefits 
to harms and our contention that overdiagnosis can only be defined at population level. 
While there may be intrinsic moral goods in allowing or supporting each individual to judge 
what matters to her, this provides little guidance for determining whether or not a pattern of 
care is causing overdiagnosis in a population.  
 
                                                 
iv
 Such distortions of health systems have been recognised by others under different guises: examples 
include Julian Tudor Hart’s inverse care law (see: 33. Tudor Hart J. The inverse care law. The Lancet 
1971;297(7696):405-12.) and Brody and Light’s inverse benefit law (see: 34. Brody H, Light DW. The 
Inverse Benefit Law: How Drug Marketing Undermines Patient Safety and Public Health. Am. J. Public 
Health 2011;101(3):399-404.).  
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An alternative could be characterised as a substantive view: that is, a view that experts or 
authorities should define which benefits, harms and costs are important in each case, and 
determine how they should be measured. Overdiagnosis cannot be estimated in populations, 
and medicine cannot function, without some substantive view of which benefits and harms 
matter. Those who emphasise a substantive view may prioritise minimization of harm (even 
at the expense of individual choice), or hold that decision-making should rely on expert, not 
lay, knowledge. A substantive position also has weaknesses: experts are likely to disagree on 
which harms or benefits matter, and may seek to coercively impose the interventions they 
prefer onto individuals. Somehow the significant heterogeneity of risk, disease and illness 
experience needs to be adequately reflected in the substantive position taken.  And even if 
experts attempt to take ‘the patient perspective’ into account, they can never completely 
capture and reflect what matters to any given individual. To quote Greenhalgh and 
colleagues:  
… [Patients] live in the messy, idiosyncratic, and unpredictable world of a particular 
person in a particular family context (or, for some, in a context of social isolation 
and/or abandonment by family)… patients’ priorities ‘on average’…can never fully 
capture the situated, fluctuating granularity of what matters most to a particular 
patient and carer at a particular point in the illness journey.39 
 
Greenhalgh and colleagues go on to argue that Evidence Based Medicine (which is, at its 
heart, an attempt to integrate best evidence of benefits and harms into clinical practice) is 
biased in systematic ways that de-privilege human experience and exclude what matters to 
people.v Thus while a birds-eye, population-level, average view of benefits and harms is 
necessary even to determine whether overdiagnosis is occurring, it needs to be nuanced and 
responsive to heterogeneity in experience and values, and it can never be sufficient, 
particularly when intervening with individuals.   
 
Although they may seem incommensurable, proceduralist and substantive views are likely to 
be combined in practice. Substantive assessments of benefit and harm may be strengthened 
if they are procedurally just (e.g. by including citizens and being transparent). Conversely, 
individuals cannot make good choices about interventions without some substantive content 
to consider. The balance between substantive and procedural concerns will likely shift 
depending on the case. If experts agree that a test or procedure is extremely harmful to 
many people, for example, few would argue that all patients should be offered the test and 
invited to fully consider its benefits and harms. More frequently, however, the benefits and 
harms of an intervention will be equivocal. Diagnosis of and intervention for cardiovascular 
disease risk in most people, for example, is of equivocal benefit.40 In such situations, the 
determination of the rate of overdiagnosis will need to be contextualised in careful 
qualification about how benefits and harms were selected and valued, it may be appropriate 
to run processes such as community juries that seek citizen guidance for policymaking, and 
shared decision making may become especially important in the clinic.  
                                                 
v
 This is so even in the generation of the evidence on which researchers draw to calculate the balance of 
benefits to harms. Greenhalgh and colleagues describe the Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, in 
which investigators concluded that ‘intensive’ diabetes control was justified because it led to a 
reduction in microvascular complications. This was despite them cataloguing the ‘comas, seizures, and 
fatal motor accidents’ due to severe hypoglycaemia that resulted from intensive control. The people 
with Type I diabetes experiencing these hypoglycaemic episodes may have taken a different view, as 
discussed in 39. Greenhalgh T, Snow R, Ryan S, Rees S, Salisbury H. Six ‘biases’ against patients and 
carers in evidence-based medicine. BMC Med. 2015;13(1):1-11. 
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Defining overdiagnosis: a summary 
Our first guiding question was: How should overdiagnosis be defined? We began with the 
common meaning-in-use of overdiagnosis—a correct diagnosis that does not benefit—and 
developed and contextualized it further. Our argument thus has produced the following 
definition of overdiagnosis.  
Consider a condition prevalent in a population, customarily labelled with Diagnosis A. We 
propose that overdiagnosis is occurring in respect of that condition in that population when:  
1) the condition is being identified and labelled with Diagnosis A in that population 
(consequent interventions may also be offered);  
2) this identification and labelling would be accepted as correct in a relevant 
professional community; but  
3) the resulting label and/or intervention carries an unfavourable balance between 
benefits and harms. 
As we have shown, benefits and harms occur at the level of individuals and populations; 
citizens, patients and experts have a role in identifying and weighting relevant benefits and 
harms. 
The normative significance of overdiagnosis  
Our second guiding question was: What are the ethical implications of overdiagnosis? We 
have already noted that overdiagnosis is unavoidably normative: it cannot be defined 
without considering benefit and harm.  However normative arguments about overdiagnosis 
tend to be underdeveloped. The moral wrong of overdiagnosis is tacitly assumed to be 
equivalent to the harm done: the more harm, the more wrong; the less harm, the less wrong. 
We aim to capture a wider range of relevant moral considerations and sketch a framework 
for making moral judgments about overdiagnosis. Although this aim suggests a certain 
degree of generalisability, we note that the foundation for any judgments about 
overdiagnosis must be in the details of the particular case, including:  
1. what relevant professional communities accept as correct judgements and actions;  
2. the process by which these positions were formed; and  
3. an account of what benefits and harms are relevant, with a balance between substantive 
and procedural, population and individual concerns.  
 
It seems reasonable for moral evaluation to be founded in consequences, that is, to assume 
that more harmful and costly overdiagnosis will undermine utility most strongly, and thus be 
more ethically problematic. However we propose adding two further considerations:  
1. The degree to which overdiagnosis is avoidable: the more avoidable, the less morally 
justifiable.  
2. The goal of the actors involved, especially whether the actor seeks to benefit themselves, 
or to benefit patients or citizens. This distinguishes overdiagnosing judgements and 
actions designed primarily to benefit patients or society from those designed primarily to 
benefit the actor (clinician, corporation or state). This distinction is by no means 
dichotomous, and one actor may have multiple goals.  
 
 
Three types of overdiagnosing action with different normative implications 
The degree of harm, avoidability of harm, and actors’ goals, interact to produce a typology of 
overdiagnosing actions. We propose these as ideal types in a sociological sense: they are 
referents against which messy, real cases can be compared. They do not seem morally 
equivalent.  We have named the three types predatory, tragic and misdirected overdiagnosis. 
Recall that, in all three types, the balance between benefits and harms must be unfavourable 
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(as specified in the definition of overdiagnosis), and that the greater the harm, the more 
morally problematic. This is assumed in the following section.  
 
Predatory overdiagnosing actions  
Predatory overdiagnosis occurs in situations where consequent harms are avoidable, and 
goal of the actor or actors is self-benefit. Predatory overdiagnosing actions include those that 
expand a professional standard for personal gain, or apply such an expanded standard for 
personal gain. They tend to be characterised by novelty, adding to the diagnoses considered 
correct in a professional community, or redefining new practices, or previously ‘incorrect’ 
practices, as correct. Predatory actions may include: coining new conditions, expanding the 
definition of conditions, increasing testing frequency, or introducing new, more sensitive 
testing technologies. Actors engaged in predatory overdiagnosis use patients primarily as a 
means to their own ends, as their main goal is to benefit themselves.  
 
Take, for example, a pharmaceutical company that owns an approved drug. They create and 
promote a new, unapproved therapeutic indication for use of that drug. Through academic 
detailing to promote off-label prescribing to GPs, they achieve a meteoric rise in the 
diagnosis of this condition, use of the drug, and their own profits. However the drug has 
considerable negative effects, leading to widespread harm. Without changing formal clinical 
guidelines, the company has established a new ‘reasonable practice’ in a relevant 
professional community. Imagine then a clinician who sets up a specialist clinic providing only 
this new treatment, for profit. In both cases, the harm was entirely avoidable, and the actors 
(primarily, but not necessarily solely) set out to benefit themselves financially and 
reputationally. An example: notwithstanding the uncertain evidence and professional 
disagreement regarding the balance of benefits to harms of testosterone therapy in ageing 
men,41 the ‘Low T’ (low testosterone) campaign appears to have some predatory 
overdiagnosing characteristics.42  
 
Predatory overdiagnosis seems the least morally justifiable of the three forms. If proven, 
penalties and constraints on future liberty of relevant actions may be reasonable (for 
example, banning a company from academic detailing or contributing directly or indirectly to 
guideline development). One basis for arguing this would be an objection to individuals being 
used primarily as means to others’ ends. This conduct also seems blameworthy because it 
undermines the very basis of medicine: it is a knowing attempt to undermine professional 
standards which are hard-won, necessary for clinical care, and the grounds for a relationship 
of trust between the profession and the community. 
 
Tragic overdiagnosis 
Tragic overdiagnosis, in contrast, seems the least blameworthy, and may be morally 
justifiable. In this case harms are unavoidable, and the goal of the actor or actors is mainly to 
benefit others (e.g. people with the condition). Tragic overdiagnosis may occur when 
relevant professional communities do not yet recognise that a test or treatment may cause 
harm, or when there is great disagreement in relevant professional communities, or when 
guidance to clinicians is unclear. It is likely that tragic overdiagnosis can be seen only in 
retrospect, when it becomes apparent that the balance of benefits to harms of a diagnosis is 
substantially worse than was originally thought.   
 
One example of tragic overdiagnosis may be the Japanese program to screen infants for 
neuroblastoma.2 This cancer occurs almost exclusively in small children, is (now known to be) 
highly heterogeneous, is usually detected after metastasis, and can regress.43 Japan started 
screening infants for neuroblastoma in 1984, when awareness of overdiagnosis in cancer 
screening was low; it seems plausible that relevant professional communities expected 
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screening to help patients. In 2002, Canadian and German studies of neuroblastoma 
screening showed no mortality benefit; the Japanese government consequently organised a 
review of the program; it was disbanded in March 2004.44 The fact that the program ended 
(rather than continuing in the face of contradictory evidence) suggests a goal of benefiting 
children outweighed any goal of benefiting clinicians or the health service. Taken together, 
this suggests that, especially in its earliest incarnation, the overdiagnosis in the Japanese 
neuroblastoma screening program was largely tragic.   
 
As we previously noted, tragic and predatory overdiagnosis are not strongly dichotomous 
categories: rather they are opposite ends of a continuum. Between them, and even more 
complex, is misdirected overdiagnosis.   
Misdirected overdiagnosis 
Misdirected overdiagnosis sits between tragic and predatory overdiagnosis: it occurs when 
harm is avoidable, but the goal of the actor or actors is primarily to benefit others (patients 
or citizens). Take for example, a group of specialists committed to a new imaging technology: 
they believe it will revolutionise early detection of a disease. They work with their College to 
introduce the technology to standard practice. There is a resulting rapid increase in the 
incidence of the disease but outcomes do not improve. Some people are actively harmed by 
further unnecessary tests and treatments. Misdirected overdiagnosis has occurred. This may 
not become apparent immediately, depending on how attentive researchers or evaluators 
are to the outcomes being generated by the interventions at a population level. Eventually, 
however, there will be at least one professional group who make an evidence-based case 
that the balance of benefits to harms of the intervention is not as favourable as was 
suggested by its proponents.  
 
It will often be a matter for argument whether a particular instance of overdiagnosis is 
predatory, misdirected or tragic. Take CT screening for early detection of lung cancer.45  
Assuming that screening was considered correct in some relevant community, the resulting 
overdiagnosis could be predatory, misdirected or tragic. The more those promoting screening 
set out to make money or enhance their own reputations, and the more likely harms were 
known, then the more predatory the overdiagnosis becomes. If the advocates of screening 
were primarily motivated by helping patients, but they should have predicted non-benefit, 
they produced misdirected overdiagnosis. Now imagine a CT technician, advised that the new 
standard practice in her profession is to screen people for lung cancer. She believes this will 
save people’s lives. If she could not be reasonably expected to know that screening would do 
more harm than benefit, the overdiagnosis is tragic. If—and this is more likely—the 
technician was not self-interested but should have predicted that screening could harm 
rather than benefit because this is a common feature of new tests, the overdiagnosis is 
misdirected.  
 
Consider one more example: bladder cancer. Urologists decided some time ago that being 
diagnosed with the lowest grade of bladder cancer caused harm and did not cause enough 
benefit to outweigh the harm. Pathological changes were observable, but calling them 
‘cancer’ led to unnecessary, harmful investigations and treatments.46 By recognising this 
problem and changing the diagnostic label, urologists changed the official professional 
understanding of ‘correct’ clinical practice for this condition. However imagine that some 
urologists disagree and continue to argue that that these patients should be diagnosed with 
cancer.  Before the reclassification, a urologist whose goal was to help her patients, but 
harmed them by diagnosing them with the lowest grade of bladder cancer, would have 
produced tragic overdiagnosis. After the change, a urologist who persisted in applying the old 
standard with the goal of helping patients, and in so doing perpetuates the unfavourable 
14 
 
balance between benefits and harms, would produce misdirected overdiagnosis. If a group of 
urologists formed a new society to promulgate continued diagnosis of low-grade bladder 
cancer to protect their own incomes, despite understanding the likelihood of non-benefit or 
harm, they would be engaging in predatory overdiagnosis. If, eventually, the consensus 
became overwhelming, such that clinicians applying the old standard were individual 
outliers, their diagnoses would simply be incorrect rather than overdiagnosis.  
 
Misdirected overdiagnosis is the most difficult to evaluate normatively: it seems likely to be 
unjustifiable but not unconscionable. It seems reasonable to recognize the moral worth of 
seeking to benefit others, and to focus remedies on improving and enforcing professional 
standards for reasonable practice, rather than condemning or sanctioning individual actors. 
How clear are these distinctions? 
In general, we believe these distinctions are useful for normative reasoning about 
overdiagnosis. Occasionally the types will exist in a pure form. For example, predatory 
overdiagnosis might be proven if the internal documents of a drug manufacturer are 
discovered, and these spell out a plan to invent a new condition, for a profit motive, in spite 
of known harms. But this will be rare: it is more useful to consider predatory, misdirected 
and tragic overdiagnosis to be ideal types. Determining the goals of an actor can be difficult, 
and actors frequently have multiple goals. Judgments of avoidability are also complex, and 
depend on the relevant professional standard. Thus professionals in different disciplines or 
sub-disciplines may allocate a well-intentioned action differently to misdirected (avoidable) 
or tragic (unavoidable) overdiagnosis. And the standard will not always be clear, especially 
for diagnosis, which tends to be less well understood, researched and regulated than 
treatment.  This complexity and opacity suggests that overdiagnosing actions may often be 
predatory, misdirected or tragic by degree, rather than absolutely. 
If predatory, misdirected and tragic overdiagnosis produce the same consequences, aren’t 
they morally equivalent? 
A possible objection to our argument may come from an act utilitarian position. As noted, 
implicitly utilitarian reasoning is common in the overdiagnosis literature (the more harm 
done, the more morally unjustified the overdiagnosis). If this was correct, then tragic, 
misdirected and predatory overdiagnosis would all be equally bad, providing they produced 
the same quantity of harm.   
 
However most approaches to public health ethics are more layered. Like us, they begin from 
consequences and augment with other moral concerns, such as respect for liberty or 
autonomy, procedural and distributive justice, proportionality, necessity and reciprocity.47 
Our overall approach—adding moral considerations to a consequentialist foundation—thus 
has considerable precedent in the literature. We have added those features that appear 
most morally relevant to us; the resulting approach is sensitive to degrees of moral 
culpability and thus appropriateness of sanctions. However we expect that there will be 
other frameworks developed and some contest of ideas before any consensus can be 
reached on which moral concerns are most relevant. 
Fundamental problems facing the normative evaluation of overdiagnosis 
We conclude with four unresolved ethical questions arising from the current landscape of 
overdiagnosis and the need to address it.  
 
Procedural justice in identifying benefits, harms and professional standards  
Throughout, we have emphasized the potential conflicts in determining reasonable actions, 
and relevant benefits or harms. Many epidemiologists and economists are currently working 
to quantify the benefits, harms and costs of potentially overdiagnosing interventions. To do 
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this, they need to make assumptions about the standard for reasonable actions, as these 
separate ‘correct’ from ‘incorrect’ care, and so separate overdiganosis from error. They also 
need to define the benefits, harms and costs that they will measure and model. But these 
assumptions are often implicit. The overdiagnosis movement may benefit from a more 
procedurally just approach to addressing these fundamental problems. For example, 
community juries or the principles of accountability for reasonableness could be used to 
determine what benefits, harms and costs should matter and why.48 49 In addition to being 
goods in themselves, such processes would provide fairer means for negotiating differences 
between professional standards and communities.  
Who is morally responsible for overdiagnosis, including the opportunity costs? 
The literature is not clear on who should reasonably be held responsible for fixing the 
problem of overdiagnosis. It is variously implied that policymakers, clinicians, lawmakers, 
manufacturers and/or citizens should act. There are many open questions in this area. Is it 
reasonable, for example, to expect citizens to engage with detailed information and make 
their own decisions if experts cannot reach agreement on what is reasonable? Or if predatory 
ovediagnosis is identified, who should respond to contain it? We have shown that 
overdiagnosis is multi-factorial, and it seems likely that different actors may be responsible 
for different components.  For example, regulators or the courts may be responsible for 
sanctioning the worst cases of predatory overdiagnosis, while individual clinicians may only 
be responsible for avoiding misdirected overdiagnosis by examining their clinical goals and 
adhering to a justifiable professional standard. Our analysis emphasizes that overdiagnosis is 
an artefact of systems of health care. This suggests we should be wary of over-individualizing 
moral responsibility for the problem. In fact, some of the core elements of our system—such 
as defining and maintaining the integrity of professional standards—require collective effort 
for their achievement, and are corporate goods in themselves.  
 
Individuals will carry some moral responsibility for some forms of overdiagnosis, perhaps 
most strongly predatory overdiagnosis. However collective actors such as states or 
professional bodies may reasonably be held responsible for providing the structures needed 
to minimize the chance of future overdiagnosis. So, for example, if professional standards are 
in conflict, and some suggest harms are large and avoidable, there may be a shared 
obligation to reach fair agreement on which standard is correct. If the conclusion is that large 
avoidable harms are occurring, there may be a collective obligation to strongly guide 
individual clinicians (who rely on the standard) away from testing, rather than maintaining a 
laissez-faire practice environment with substantial potential for individual clinical discretion. 
If predatory actors continue to promote alternative pro-testing standards, and funding 
arrangements make testing easy, collective actors such as Colleges, expert bodies, and the 
research community may be obliged to actively promulgate their agreed standard, criticize 
problematic standards, remove funding for testing, and/or sanction predatory actors.  
 
Recognising overdiagnosis as a matter for distributive justice 
Overdiagnosis is a matter for distributive justice in two competing ways. First, a pressing 
moral problem with overdiagnosing interventions is their structural effects on the health care 
system. Overdiagnosis often arises from the application of expensive new testing or 
treatment technologies. This diverts resources away from basic health services and public 
health interventions, and may threaten the sustainability of universal health care where it 
exists.32 This is likely to effect the least-well-off, who are least able to pay for services, most 
strongly. This is a matter for justice and a loss of a corporate good, and can only be addressed 
at a systems level. 
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Conversely—and paradoxically—limiting diagnostic categories may redefine individuals as 
non-diseased, or even malingering, which may remove the health and social care that follows 
official medical labels. A diagnosis can provide access not just to medical care but also to 
social, welfare and other services. For example, being diagnosed with a mental illness may be 
a pathway not only to drug treatment, but also to psychological treatment, social supports, 
or a disability pension. An ADHD diagnosis may facilitate not only drug treatment, but also 
extra help in the classroom, or parenting support. While the idea of medicalizing ‘normal’ life 
experiences can be very reasonably critiqued and may do harm in itself,5 26 there can also be 
beneficial social effects of receiving a medical label.  
 
Thus, efforts to reduce overdiagnosis may have negative social consequences for the people 
who rely on the social power of that diagnosis. This is not morally neutral, particularly when 
public services are under threat. It may also especially disadvantage the least-well-off who 
may lose access to services without the power of a diagnostic label. This is the paradox: 
overdiagnosis may misallocate needed funds away from universal health care, which will 
disadvantage the least-well-off; but curbing overdiagnosis may also remove services from the 
least-well-off.  
 
There is no easy answer, and as previously noted, different groups may be differently 
responsible for this problem. Researchers, for example, should take care to include all 
potential benefits and harms, and their distribution, in estimating the effects of interventions 
to limit overdiagnosis. Policymakers, Colleges and other groups with responsibility for 
practice change should be especially attentive to effects in already-disadvantaged 
communities. This includes not just the effects of change (e.g. the possibility that social 
services may be lost if a medical diagnosis is removed) but also the effects of remaining with 
the status quo (e.g. the harm that may be done if people continue to be overdiagnosed). It 
should be noted that the possibility of unintended harms should not prevent action: rather, 
action should be taken in such a way as to monitor and minimise new harms. Returning to 
our earlier discussion of identifying benefits and harms, it is likely that potential harms or loss 
of benefits will only be fully understood if affected communities are included in decision-
making.  
 
Responding to the experience of those who may have been overdiagnosed 
The final unresolved moral challenge of overdiagnosis is in relation to the harms that may be 
done by the way overdiagnosis is communicated. Intervention to limit overdiagnosis is 
generally motivated by a desire to limit harms done to populations by overdiagnosing 
interventions. However this has implications with regard to the counterfactual problem.  
Recall the two women, both diagnosed and treated with breast cancer, one of whom has 
been overdiagnosed. With low awareness of overdiagnosis, both women are likely to think 
themselves saved by screening and the onerous treatment they subsequently undertook. As 
awareness of overdiagnosis is raised, both women are likely to question whether or not they 
have been overdiagnosed. They may, as a result, experience distress or existential doubts 
and lose trust in the institution of medicine. This is not a reason to avoid communicating 
about overdiagnosis, but it does suggest a need for care and the provision of appropriate 
supports to those affected.   
 
Conclusion  
The questions we have addressed (How should overdiagnosis be defined? What are the 
ethical implications of overdiagnosis?) need to be resolved to provide direction and clarity in 
this relatively new field. Our analysis on these two questions is summarised in Figure 1 
(definition) and Table 2 (ethical evaluation).  
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Figure 1: Defining overdiagnosis 
 
 
a. An overdiagnosis is a correct diagnosis. Item 2 in Figure 1 outlines the basis for determining that a diagnosis is 
correct (i.e. relative to a standard negotiated within a relevant professional community). This has implications. 
If there is no professional standard, it may not be possible to identify overdiagnosis (or distinguish it from false 
positives and other errors). If there are competing professional standards, there will be disagreement on 
whether overdiagnosis has occurred. It is important to be critical about processes for setting standards (which 
involve power and competing interests within professional communities). 
 
b. Calculating the balance between benefits and harms is complex. There are relevant benefits and harms at the 
level of the individual and the population. There are also a range of perspectives on what harms and benefits 
matter, and all should be considered: citizens, patients and experts. Although there is merit in individuals being 
able to judge what harms and benefits matter to them, the harms of overdiagnosis are observable in 
populations, and some collective judgement about the balance of benefits to harms resulting from an 
intervention is necessary. 
 
Table 2: An ethical evaluation of overdiagnosis  
Basic principles 
1. Reason case by case: each case will be different. 
2. Start with consequences. For overdiagnosis to be occurring, there must be an unfavourable 
balance of benefits to harms (see Figure 1, including caveats on determining benefit and 
harm). The more harm is being done, the less justifiable the overdiagnosis. 
3. Also take into account avoidability of overdiagnosis and goals of the actor/s generating 
overdiagnoses. 
 More avoidable Less avoidable 
Primary goal of the actor is to 
benefit themselves 
Predatory overdiagnosis
a
  
Primary goal of the actor is to 
benefit patients or citizens 
Misdirected overdiagnosis
b
 Tragic overdiagnosis
c
 
a. The more predatory overdiagnosing actions are, the more morally unconscionable they are. Collective 
actors (e.g. courts, regulators, professional colleges) should restrict the ability of predatory actors to 
continue to create and benefit from overdiagnosis. This may include targeting particular clinicians or 
organisations. 
b. Misdirected overdiagnosing actions require systemic changes: to strengthen and promote the 
professional standard and improve routine healthcare practices. Individual clinicians may have a 
responsibility to be alert to, and avoid, possible misdirected overdiagnosis.   
c. The more tragic overdiagnosing actions are, the more justifiable they are (although they remain 
unfortunate). However health systems should be alert to possible emerging instances of overdiagnosis 
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(e.g. through horizon scanning) and act to prevent them from becoming institutionalised as routine care.  
 
Our most important conclusion is that overdiagnosis is a shared problem. Informing 
individual citizens and patients, and supporting them to make decisions about their 
healthcare in accordance with their own values, is morally important. But, as we have 
argued, overdiagnosis can only be observed at a population level, it arises from changes in 
the routine operation of health systems, it is judged in relation to standards set within 
professions, its recognition depends on agreement regarding which benefits and harms 
matter and how they should be measured, and most of the solutions to it require the 
cooperation or action of collective agents such as professional colleges, regulators or even 
courts. Individuals, whether clinicians, patients or citizens, cannot be expected to prevent 
overdiagnosis alone: this will only occur when health systems attend to both benefits and 
harms, and regularly reorient to prioritise beneficial over harmful healthcare. Other authors 
are working on definitions and frameworks, and there is likely to be some contest over these 
in coming years. We believe that our approach draws out important features of 
overdiagnosis as a definitional and moral problem, and provides useful groundwork. We look 
forward to participating in the ongoing conversation as it progresses. 
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